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Abstract 
After decades of strong commitment to nuclear power by the Japanese government, rising anti-nuclear sentiment among the public 
following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear incident has forced the government to re-evaluate the country’s reliance on nuclear 
power. Japan’s subsequent switch to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) demonstrated the utilities’ preference for LNG as the large scale 
alternative option to nuclear power. The reliance on natural gas looks set to grow in the years ahead as the utilities are constructing 
12 new gas-fired power generation units in 2014 alone, as replacement for nuclear power and to scale back on the use of expensive 
oil for power generation. This growing reliance on LNG imports came at a time the IEA said that the world is entering into a 
“golden age of gas” due to progress in exploration and extraction technology resulting in the North American shale gas boom and 
the expansion of LNG trade. Although natural gas is much less polluting than all the other fossil-fuel alternatives, it is still a carbon 
intensive energy source. Japan’s growing reliance on natural gas implies that it would be increasingly difficult for Tokyo to meet its 
Kyoto Protocol pledge in reducing carbon emissions. Moreover, the Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) approach used by the 
International Energy Agency has demonstrated that the cost of electricity generation from natural gas is higher than nuclear. 
Already, Japan’s growing reliance on LNG has contributed significantly to its first trade deficit since the second oil shock (1979-
1980). In this paper, we examine, in economic and political terms, how energy security, international relations, and climate change 
policy considerations are shaping the Japanese policy-makers’ debate on the country’s future energy mix. We argue that in addition 
to domestic concerns over cost and social acceptance, Japan’s decision on its future energy mix will also be shaped by: first, global 
energy security trends; second, the priority the government attaches to addressing global climate change; and third, Tokyo’s 
international relations strategy to elevate Japan’s diplomatic and strategic clout. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper holistically examines the drivers influencing policy-makers in determining Japan’s future energy mix in 
the context of energy security, climate change and international relations under the current Abe Cabinet. The first 
nuclear power reactor began commercial operation in 1966. Since then, nuclear energy became a national strategic 
priority until the Fukushima nuclear incident in March 2011 thwarted the momentum of nuclear power development in 
this third largest producer of nuclear power in the world after the United States and France [1]. Japan imports more 
than 85% energy resources. Oil remained the largest share in Japan’s energy mix at about 43% as of 2011. The share 
of natural gas rose from 18% in 2010 to 22% in 2011 of total energy consumption. In contrast, the share of nuclear in 
total energy consumption fell from 13% in 2010 to 7% in 2011 [2]. Japan virtually relies on LNG imports for all of its 
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natural gas imports and is the world’s largest LNG importer, accounting for around one-third of global LNG trade 
volume. According to the Economist [3], Japan was entirely without nuclear energy as of November 2013. However, 
since Shinzo Abe of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) became the Prime Minister again in September 2012, he has 
been pushing for the country’s 50 usable reactors to restart as soon as possible provided they pass safety checks by the 
Nuclear Regulation Authority.  
Since the Fukushima incident, there have been multiple uncertainties with regards to Japan’s future energy mix. 
These uncertainties primarily centered on the country’s energy security and competitiveness, the carbon emission 
reductions pledge, and Japan’s international relations and national security. McLellan and others [4] discussed Japan’s 
post-Fukushima energy strategy based on the three nuclear scenarios announced by the Japanese government. Drawing 
on the energy system modeling analysis, their paper concluded that it was possible for Japan to improve its energy 
security but unlikely for it to achieve the country’s environmental commitments. Hayashi and Hughes [5] examined in 
detail, the crisis-driven changes to policy and regulations instituted by the Japanese government and electricity 
suppliers in the immediate aftermath of the accident up to May 2012. Their paper discussed a number of different 
energy futures for Japan to improve its long-term energy policies following the Fukushima incident. They concluded 
that a radical shift in Japan’s energy policy was unrealistic, considering the cost of electricity and carbon emission 
reduction commitments. Meanwhile, alternative electricity generation sources, such as renewables currently cannot 
provide baseload supply as they remain too costly to build and are intermittent in supply. 
Following the Fukushima incident, public opinion shifted against nuclear power in Japan. In a recent case study by 
Kato and others [6], more Japanese citizens had negative perceptions towards nuclear power post-Fukushima, despite 
the incentive program such as utility bill refund and other social welfare compensation. The paper concluded that 
restarting the nuclear power plants would require an integrated approach of limiting accident risks, rebuilding trust of 
Japan’s nuclear policy, careful consideration of national merits, and a proper choice of the mode of provision of 
economic incentives.  
Given the volatility of the natural gas market, Japan’s import-dependent energy economy, and its record setting 
trade deficit, primarily due to the increase in LNG import post-Fukushima, forsaking nuclear could mean higher a 
energy bill and greater uncertainty for the Japanese economy. It also has implications for Japan’s international 
relations and national security.  
2. Japan’s Changing Energy Profile 
2.1. Before and After the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Incident 
Japan under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) adopted a new Basic Energy Plan in June 2010 with an ambitious 
target for 2030 through a substantial change in energy mix and improved energy efficiency measures. The document 
set out the plan to double the percentage of electricity produced by renewable sources from 6% (2007 levels) to 13% 
and through nuclear power from 10 to 24%, with reduced reliance on fossil fuels so as to raise the “zero emission 
power supply ratio” from the current 34% to 70%. The document also laid out plans for improving energy efficiency. 
The overall intention was for Japan to, by 2030, achieve a 30% reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions from the 
1990 level, the baseline for the Kyoto Protocol [7]. 
However, the March 2011 Fukushima incident led to a loss of public confidence in the use of nuclear power and the 
DPJ-led government was forced to revise its Basic Energy Policy; which as of December 2013 is yet to be finalised as 
the reliance on nuclear power in Japan’s future energy mix is still being debated. While the post-Fukushima Basic 
Energy Policy remains under discussion, the DPJ-led government in 2012 pledged to close all nuclear plants by the 
end of 2030s (“zero-nuclear”). However, Abe reversed this decision after becoming Prime Minister and expressed his 
desire to restart Japan’s nuclear power plants once they are certified safe. As will be discussed below, Abe’s decision 
to avoid a case of “zero-nuclear” is driven by his concerns over Japan’s energy security and competitiveness, carbon 
emission commitments, as well as the strategic importance he attaches to the nuclear industry of Japan. 
2.2. Abe’s Concerns Over Energy Security and Climate Change 
According to data from the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, the total cost of power generation by Japan’s 
twelve general and wholesale electric utilities increased from 7.5 trillion Yen in 2010 before the Fukushima incident to 
9.6 trillion Yen in 2011, reaching 10.6 trillion Yen in 2012. The fuel cost of thermal power generation almost doubled, 
from 3.7 trillion Yen in 2010 to 7.3 trillion Yen in 2012, mainly due to the cost of purchasing LNG and fuel oil [8]. 
Soon after the Fukushima incident, there was a sudden surge in Japan’s energy bill, especially in its LNG imports. 
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According to Komiyama [9], LNG imports into Japan increased by 14%, from 2010 to 2012, bringing the share of 
LNG in the energy mix from 29% in 2010 to 43% in 2012. Compared with the LNG import cost of 3.8 trillion Yen in 
2010, the increase in the LNG imports from the spot market increased the fuel import costs by 2.5 trillion Yen in 2011, 
3.7 trillion Yen in 2012, and is estimated at 5 trillion Yen in 2013. Significantly, such reliance on fossil fuel imports, 
particularly on LNG, contributed to the country’s first trade deficit since the second oil shock (1979-1980). The 17 
straight months of trade deficit – as of November 2013 - is the longest stretch since comparable data began more than 
three decades ago. 
If nuclear power were to be removed from the energy mix in the long term, the rising import cost of LNG would 
likely be unsustainable for the Japanese economy with increasing manufacturing cost affecting the competitiveness of 
the country’s exports. Furthermore, adding more LNG to the energy mix would not only further expose Japan to the 
volatile LNG spot market, but also reduce the portfolio diversification of Japan’s energy mix. The only other 
economically viable baseload alternatives at present would be coal and oil. In fact, Japan has in 2013 increased its coal 
use as a means to lower the cost for power generation. Japan’s 10 main utilities consumed 16 % more coal in the first 
10 months of 2013, compared to the previous year and imported nearly 11% more [10]. It would raise Japan’s carbon 
emission and increase in the release of airborne pollutants. Besides, switching to other fossil fuels would not alleviate 
Japan’s exposure to supply disruptions, price fluctuations and sea lines of communication vulnerabilities. Although 
final energy demand reductions can be achieved through technological advancements, these carbon emission savings 
were unlikely to suppress the increase in Japan’s carbon emissions, threatening the country’s commitments towards 
global mitigation efforts.  
In reflection of the loss of nuclear power capacity, Japan in November 2013 announced that it would target a 3.8% 
emissions cut by 2020 below 2005 levels. This amounts to a 3.1% target above 1990 levels, which contrasted sharply 
with the 25% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels committed in 2009 based on pre-Fukushima emissions 
reduction plans [11]. This indicates that Japan realizes that it cannot cut much of its greenhouse gas emissions unless it 
revives its nuclear power plants. These revised targets also suggest that Abe is aware that the prospects for restarting 
Japan’s nuclear power plants to operate at pre-Fukushima levels will remain low due to public resistance. 
3. The Strategic Importance of Japan’s Nuclear Industrial Base 
Besides cost and environmental considerations, Abe attaches strategic importance to the country’s nuclear 
industrial base for the critical role it plays in enhancing Japan’s international status and national security. First, nuclear 
energy cooperation is an important component of US-Japan cooperation against international nuclear proliferation 
[12]. Thus, the US is reluctant to see Japan adopt a “zero-nuclear” policy. It has also been noted that cooperation in the 
nuclear sphere provided substance to the US-Japan security alliance, enabling Japan to play a supporting role to the 
US in the international security arena [12, 13]. Second, Japan’s advanced nuclear-industrial base, meant that some of 
the components used by three of the four most modern American and French nuclear reactor designs can only be made 
in Japan. Japan’s decision to go “zero-nuclear” would therefore affect the US and French nuclear industries [14]. 
Japan is thus recognized internationally as a significant international vendor promoting safe and reliable civilian 
nuclear power and the country’s status as a premium international nuclear technological leader is something Abe 
would like to preserve. Third, Japan uses its nuclear technological know-how and strong anti-proliferation credentials 
to advocate the peaceful use of nuclear energy [15]. Abe recognizes that this is a useful tool to enhance Japan’s 
international profile as a peace-loving country. 
Fourth, and paradoxically, there are some within the Japanese ruling elite, including members of the LDP which 
Abe belongs to, who believe that Japan should retain its nuclear technological capability so that it would have the 
potential to produce and possess its own nuclear weapons should such a need arises as a form of credible deterrence 
[16] [17]. Ichiyo [18] explained the formation of Japan’s nuclear power regime as part of national security, namely, 
“nuclear power as potential nuclear armament” as a key motivation. According to this interpretation, Japan’s advanced 
nuclear-industrial base is the core of Japan’s national security and the “custodian of nuclear armament potential”. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The International Energy Agency said that the world is entering into a “golden age of gas” due to progress in 
exploration and extractions technology resulting in the North American shale gas boom and the expansion of the LNG 
trade. However, Japan’s growing reliance on LNG is in many ways a setback for the country that had sought to 
enhance its energy security by reducing fossil fuel imports, including LNG, and to counter global warming by 
increasing its reliance on nuclear energy. This paper highlighted the key domestic and international considerations the 
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current Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe has to take into account, in shaping Japan’s future energy policy, namely 
the cost of LNG - imports and its effects on the Japanese economy and competitiveness, as well as the strategic 
importance of the Japan’s nuclear-industrial base to the country’s international clout and national security.  
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